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SWITZERLAND: NEW EXCEPTIONS TO BANK SECRECY LAWS
AIMED AT MONEY LAUNDERING AND ORGANIZED CRIME
MichaIe Moser
I. IhnRODUCTION
Swiss banking secrecy has protected victims of persecution for over
three centuries. First created to protect Huguenots fleeing France,' Swiss
banking secrecy was maintained during World War II to protect the
identity of refugees from Nazi persecution.2 More recently, however,
money laundering and organized crime have subverted this underlying,
noble purpose of Swiss banking secrecy. In order to meet the challenge
presented by the sheltering of criminal activity, Switzerland must recon-
sider its renowned commitment to absolute banking secrecy. An amend-
ment to Article 305' of the Swiss Penal Code,3 recently adopted by the
Swiss parliament, maintains the basic principle of banking secrecy while
tailoring appropriate exceptions aimed at criminal banking activity. As a
result, the new law appeases international pressure on Switzerland to relax
its banking secrecy laws, eliminates conflicts currently existing in Swiss
law concerning banking secrecy, and provides an increased deterrent to
money laundering. However, success in curbing money laundering merely
by its enactment is unlikely. The Swiss bankers' willingness to avail
themselves of the new law will be the determinative factor.
Critics have labelled Switzerland as the money laundering center of
the world.4 One critic blames the Swiss banking system for the reputation
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1995).
DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY 663-99 (1992); COORDINAT-
ING COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESENCE OF SwrIzERLAND ABROAD, SWITZERLAND AN
INSME Vmw: POLrICS, ECONOMY, CULTURE, SOCIETY, NATURE 132 (1992) [hereinafter
PRESENCE OF SWrrZERLAND].
2 PRESENCE OF SWrIZERLAND, supra note 1, at 133.
3 Message concernant la modification du code pinal Suisse et du code penal
militaire [Message Concerning the Modification of the Swiss Penal Code and of the
Military Penal Code], 19 FMILLE F)DERALE, 145e ann e Vol. III (June 30, 1993)
(translated by author) [hereinafter Message]. This document is the product of an in-
depth study of money-laundering and organized crime in Switzerland conducted by an
Expert Committee. The document contains the new law itself, empirical findings, and
an examination of the history of the problem. The Expert Committee met during the
Pre-Parliamentary stage. See discussion infra Section VI.A.1. See also PENAL CODE
art. 3051" Marginal Note and Para. 2 (Switz.).
" In 1988 the reputation of the Swiss financial market had become so bad that
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Switzerland obtained as the country where money laundering is so
efficient that laundering there guarantees "a whiter wash."5 Since the
1970s, Swiss banking officials have attempted to prevent the image of the
Swiss financial market from being tarnished.6 Despite legislative initia-
tives during the 1980s and early 1990s,7 the Swiss financial market is
still struggling to regain its integrity. To this end, the Swiss Federal
Council proposed the new law which is designed to change the nature of
Swiss banking secrecy, from a disposition that shields criminals, back to
its original nature, which was to protect only law-abiding persons. This
Note argues that the new law provides a mechanism to curb money
laundering and organized crime, appeases international pressure, and
eliminates conflicts created by prior agreements and legislation by provid-
ing Swiss financiers the opportunity to report criminally suspicious fi-
nancial activities. Additionally, the new law helps to reestablish the Swiss
financial market's integrity internationally and prevents money laundering
activities from further tarnishing it.
This Note first examines the background of Swiss banking secrecy;
its distinctive features and its legal sources! Then the Note examines
several factors that created a need for amending Swiss banking secrecy,
including money laundering activities,' international pressure to make
banking secrecy less of an absolute right, 0 and previous agreements and
legislation which created conflicts in Swiss law." Switzerland and the
international community have made many previous attempts at changing
Swiss banking secrecy. These attempts include: several international
treaties, 2 agreements within the Swiss banking community, 3 and Swiss
penal law. 4 Each of these attempts at change have either been ineffec-
finance officials of many foreign countries dealt with Switzerland as an under-regulated
"off-shore" center. The United States and Australia are examples. Mark Pieth, Zur
Einfiihrung: Geldwdscherei und ihre Bekiimpfung in der Schweiz, in BEKAMPFUNG DER
GELDWASCHEREI: MODELLFALL SCHWEIZ? [INTRODUCTION: MONEY LAUNDERING AND
THE COMBAT AGAINST IT IN SwrrzERLAND] 1, 26 (Mark Pieth ed., 1992).
' See generally JEAN ZIEGLER, DIE SCHWEIZ WASCHT WEISSER [TrHE Swiss WASH
IT WHITER] (1990) (Jean Ziegler is a Swiss Professor of Sociology at the University
of Geneva).
6 See discussion infra Section V.B.
See discussion infra Section V.A-C.
8 See discussion infra Sections II, Ill.
9 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
10 See discussion infra Section IV.C.
See discussion infra Section IV.D.
12 See discussion infra Section V.A.
'3 See discussion infra Section V.B.
"4 See discussion infra Section V.C.
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five or have created conflicts in Swiss law. This Note then discusses the
new law,'5 its legislative history, 6 and its terms 7 and demonstrates
how the new law can solve the problems now created by Swiss banking
secrecy. Finally, this Note argues that the strengths of the Swiss banking
system support this Note's conclusion that the new law is not likely to
have any negative effects on Swiss banking.
II. BACKGROUND ON SwIss BANKING SECRECY
Bank secrecy in Switzerland derives from the principle of personal
privacy and reflects the value placed by Switzerland on individual eco-
nomic liberties.'8 Swiss law does not specifically define Swiss banking
secrecy, but according to legal custom its definition is "a banker's
professional obligation to keep in strictest confidence, all business and
affairs related to the financial and personal circumstances of clients and
some third parties to the extent that knowledge of such matters is ac-
quired in the course of business."' 9
A special feature of Swiss banking secrecy is that a violation is
subject to criminal prosecution. Although violations of professional
secrecy are prosecuted only upon the express request of the injured party,
the courts may prosecute a breach of banking secrecy on their own
initiative.2' Because of its strict banking secrecy law Switzerland is
frequently referred to as a money-haven.2 However, many other coun-
tries are internationally renowned as money-havens along with Swit-
zerland. For example, the banks in Luxembourg and the Caymen Islands
hold large amounts of foreign deposits.' Austria and the Principality of
Liechtenstein have stringent bank secrecy laws similar to those in Swit-
,S See discussion infra Section VI.
,6 See discussion infra Section VI.A.
,7 See discussion infra Section VI.B.
S Personal privacy is as important in Switzerland as first Amendment rights are in
the United States. NICHoLAs L. DEAK & JOANNE CELUSAK, INTERNATIONAL BANKING
230 (1984); Olivier Dunant & Michele Wassmer, Swiss Bank Secrecy: Its Limits Under
Swiss and International Law, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 (1988).
" CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 668.
FEDERAL BANKING LAW art. 47 (Switz.) [hereinafter FBL]; CAMPBELL, supra note
1, at 669.
21 FBL art. 47(4); CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 669.
" Switzerland's strict secrecy laws and conservative taxing system have contributed
to its reputation as a money-haven. Fletcher N. Baldwin & Robert J. Munro, Switzer-
land, in MONEY LAUNDERING, AssEr FoRFEITURE AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
CRIMEs 1, 3 (1993).
2 Id.
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zerland.24
m. THE SOURCES OF SWISS BANKING AND OTHER FINANCIAL
SECRECY
Swiss banking secrecy derives from a diverse number of authoritative
legal sources: the Penal Code, the Banking Code, the Swiss Constitution,
the Civil Code, and the Code of Obligations. The Banking Code is the
one source that is most frequently specifically referred to in relation to
banking secrecy, the other legal authorities relate to professional secrecy
in general. The sources are characterized as criminal and civil liability
sources for the financier.
A. Criminal Liability
In the Swiss Penal Code several articles address professional secrecy.
However, Article 321 of the Swiss Penal Code states that the actual bank
secrecy provision which punishes violations of professional secrecy should
be left to the Banking Code itself.' Article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code
applies to the non-bank sector of the Swiss financial market and prohibits
financiers from disclosing commercial and business secrets.' Under
Article 273, dealing with "espionage and the supplying of economic in-
formation to foreign officials and private organizations," 7 the Swiss
Penal Code imposes the duty of banking secrecy on the financier under
the theory that a disclosure of domestic information might harm Switzer-
land economically.'
The Swiss Banking Code specifically prescribes violations of banking
secrecy and outlines the consequences under criminal law of such a
violation. Article 47 of the Bank and Savings Bank Federal Act of June
8, 1934, as amended in 1971, provides the language which prohibits
bankers and other professionals from revealing secret information. Article
47 provides:
(1) Every person working at a bank has a duty to keep secrets;
24 DEAK & CELUSAK, supra note 18, at 231-32.
2 Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 18, at 542. See also PENAL CODE art. 321
(Switz.).
216 Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 18, at 544. "Any person who reveals a...
business secret which he was bound to maintain by virtue of a legal or contractual
obligation and any person who profits thereby shall, upon complaint, be punished with
imprisonment or a fine." PENAL CODE art. 162 (Switz.).
2 See PENAL CODE art. 273 (Switz.).
2 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 666-67.
[Vol. 27:321
1995] SWI7ZERLAND EXCEPTIONS TO BANK SECRECY LAWS
(2) Third parties who lead others to infringe the secrecy duty are also
to be punished, even if the offense never takes place;
(3) Infringement due to pure negligence, as well as intentional infringe-
ment, is to be punished;
(4) The infringement of bank secrecy may be prosecuted by the court
on its own initiative;
(5) The penalties are a prison term not to exceed six months or a fine
not to exceed Sfr. 50,000; either penalty may be cumulated;
(6) Breach of professional secrecy remains punishable even after termi-
nation of a public or private employment relationship or the practice of
a profession; and
(7) Bank secrecy is not absolute; in specific legal circumstances, Swiss
authorities are to be granted the right of access to private banking
records
Several qualifications to banking secrecy have been provided for
under Swiss domestic law. Exceptions may arise in civil proceedings,"
where some cantons allow bankers to testify. Swiss criminal proceed-
ings31 provide a similar exception for all cantonal and federal levels. In
" FBL, supra note 20.
30 The obligation to testify or submit documents before a civil court will mainly be de-
termined by the rules of civil procedure of the specific canton [a canton is comparable
to a state or province but is unusual in the amount of autonomy granted it by the
federal government], since the cantons have jurisdiction under the Swiss Constitution to
regulate their own courts and proceedings brought before them.
Nicholas Pierard & Nicolas Killen, Switzerland, 26 INT'L LAW. 545, available in
LEXIS, ABA Library, INTLAW File. As a result some cantons have exempted all
persons bound by professional secrecy from the duty to testify (Argau, Berne, Geneva,
Jura, Neuchatel, St. Gallen, and Vaud). Others expressly mention all categories of
professionals who are exempted from the duty of testifying, without listing bankers
(Appenzell, Basel, Glarus, Grisons, Oberwalden, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, and Thurgau).
Lastly, some cantons allow the judge to decide in each case, whether it is necessary
for bank officers to testify (Fribourg, Niderwalden, Schwyz, Ticino, Uri, Zug, and
Ztlrich). CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 674; Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 18, at 548;
HANS ScHuLTz, BANKING SECRECY AND THE SWISS-AMERICAN TREATY ON LEGAL
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATrERs 10 (1977).
3' The Federal Law on Criminal Procedure art. 77 RS 3120 (Switz.) specifies: "[tihe
only persons entitled not to testify are priests, doctors, lawyers, and public notaries,
325
CASE W. RES. J. INT*L L.
the course of administrative proceedings the only exception made to the
duty to banking secrecy involves tax fraud or tax evasion.32
B. Civil Liability
The individual's right to privacy is not included as a specially
protected fundamental right in the Swiss Constitution.3 However, the
Federal Supreme Court time and again upholds the existence of individual
rights and "considers those rights not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution to be unwritten fundamental rights with constitutional validity
and protection." '34
The Swiss Civil Code provides for the right of a person or corpora-
tion to be free of invasions of privacy, which includes their economic
privacy." Article 28(1) of the Civil Code specifies: "[w]hosoever suffers
an illegal offense against his person is entitled to ask the judge for help
against anyone joining in the offense."'3 Anyone offending another's
economic privacy, such as bankers violating their client's banking secrecy,
can therefore have recourse to the courts under the Civil Code.
The Code of Obligation in Switzerland discusses banking secrecy in
that it derives from contractual and agency principles.37 Article 394
specifies that an "agent undertakes to carry out the contractually agreed
upon business transaction or services which he has been entrusted by the
client."3 Article 398 requires the agent to exercise the same care as the
employee would be required to exercise.39 The Swiss banker must per-
form the contract with his client carefully and faithfully, which means
maintaining banking secrecy.
chemists, and midwives and their assistants." Pierard & Killen, supra note 30.
32 In the case of tax fraud or evasion "[blank secrecy will . . . be lifted in the
course of a tax fraud prosecution when the tax authorities are empowered to investigate
in direct cooperation with the banks and to seize documents." Dunant & Wassmer,
supra note 18, at 551; CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 678; Pierard & Killen, supra note
30.
33 CONsTrrUrION (Switz.); CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 664.
3 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 664.
3' Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 18, at 542.
36 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 664. See Beat Kleiner, Banking Law, in INTRODUC-
TION TO Swiss LAW 173-84 (Frangois Dessemontet et al. eds., 1981) (explaining public
banking laws applied to banks as institutions).
37 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 665; Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 18, at 542.
31 CODE OF OBLIGATION art. 394 (Switz.) (Simon L. Goren ed., 1987) [hereinafter
CODE OF OBLIGATION].
39 Id. at art. 398.
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IV. FACTORS ENCOURAGING A RELAXATION OF SWISS BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SECTOR SECRECY
Because of the increase in criminal banking activity, Swiss officials
became concerned that the world community would perceive Switzerland
negatively.' Bankers are so concerned with the poor image of Swiss
banking that the Swiss Bankers' Association (SBA) recently described
itself as the "professional body charged with safeguarding the interests
and reputation of Swiss banking ... "41 Additionally, the preamble of
the SBA42 emphasized the: "view of preserving the good name of the
Swiss banking community, nationally and internationally. . .4" In order
to maintain its status as a leader in Europe's financial market, Switzerland
needs to restore its tarnished image. The main factors that contribute to
the urgency include money laundering problems, organized crime activi-
ties, international pressure, and the need to eliminate conflicts.
A. Money Laundering
Switzerland realizes that it is in its self-interest to combat money
laundering and organized crime.' Switzerland is internationally notorious
as a haven for money laundering activities.45 Money laundering activities
are a problem in the Swiss financial market, involving and affecting many
aspects of the Swiss financial market other than banks.'
According to Article 3 05bi, money laundering is a criminal act when
the proceeds derive from any criminal activity.47 Money laundering
Protokol des 9.12.1993, StGB und MstG. Strafbarkeit der kriminellen
Organisation: Botschaft und Gesetzentwrfe [Criminal Liability of the Criminal Organi-
zation: Message and Bills], June 30, 1993 (BBI) at 81 (translated by the author) [here-
inafter Protokol 1].
41 Swiss BANKERS' ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT ON THE SWISS BANKS' CODE OF
CONDuCT WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE (1992) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter SBA AGREEMENT].
42 See discussion infra Section V.B.1.
See discussion infra Section V.B.1 (emphasis added).
Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 89.
See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
In Switzerland, Article 3 05b' of the Swiss Penal Code statutorily defines money
laundering:
1. He who shall have committed an act tending to impede the identification of the
source, the discovery or the confiscation of the assets which he knew or should have
known to be of criminal origin shall be punished by imprisonment or a fine.
2. In serious cases, the punishment shall be criminal confinement for no more than five
years. The imprisonment shall be concurrent with a fine of up to one million francs.
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internationally, involves at least three activities: "[s]muggling dirty money
to a secret Swiss ... bank account;... [a]ltering its nature and/or
origin; ... [r]epatriating the 'newly clean' money and using it for invest-
ment, pleasure or in some cases bribery."' However, in Switzerland the
days of the direct transfer of suspect liquid funds are practically over.49
Money laundering activities in the 1990s more commonly encompasses
pre-laundering of funds in off-shore markets before transferring the funds
to Switzerland."0 However, evidence of such pre-laundering activities has
also been discovered within Switzerland."' In 1989, a parliamentary in-
vestigating committee found that several financial institutions knowingly
involved themselves in pre-laundering activities.52
Pre-laundering activities typically involve "paper corporations ' that
The case is serious, particularly, when the perpetrator.
a) acts as a member of a criminal organization;
b) acts as a member of a gang formed to systematically engage in money
laundering;
c) makes a significant turnover or gain in engaging in money laundering by
profession.
3. The perpetrator shall also be punished when the principal offense has been committed
outside of Switzerland is also punishable in the country which it has been perpetrated.
Franco Taisch, Swiss Statutes Concerning Money Laundering, 26 INT'L LAW. 695,
available in LEXIS, ABA Library, INTLAW File quoting PENAL CODE art. 305b "
(Switz.). The legal definition of money laundering in the United States includes
activities such as the "investment or other transfer of money flowing from racketeering,
drag transactions, and other illegal sources into legitimate channels so that its original
source cannot be traced." 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1991).
48 THURSTON CLARKE & JOHN J. TIGUE, JR., DIRTY MONEY: Swiss BANKS, THE
MAFIA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 91 (1975).
4 Message, supra note 3, at 276.
50 Id.
", ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 98-99 (citing Bericht der Parlamentarischen
Untersuchungskomission vom 22 Nov. 1989) [Report of the Parliamentary Investigating
Committee, Nov. 22, 19891.
52 ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 99. Some of the institutions that were found by the
committee to have engaged in these pre-laundering activities include: Shakarchi Trad-
ing/Shakarco AG, Ztirich, Mecattaf AG, Zilrich, El Ariss AG, Zffrich, Guardog AG,
Zilrich, and Mirelis AG, Genf. According to the report, the bank employees that are in
the responsible positions to deal with those customers are aware that they are dealing
with monies that are the proceeds of illegal activities. Id.
" The Message refers to these corporations as "letter box societies" because fre-
quently the only evidence of the existence of the corporation is a letterbox and perhaps
a file in the desk drawer of some administrator. Message, supra note 3, at 276. See
also CLARKE & TIGUE, supra note 48, at 116 (describing the physical arrangements of
"letter boxes"). This is not surprising considering the corporation's sole function is to
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are set up in countries like Liechtenstein, Panama, or other small offshore
havens. 4 Paper corporations make it more difficult for dirty money to be
traced to suspect criminal activities. Swiss authorities are faced with that
difficulty today that when paper corporations are used in conjunction with
a Swiss bank account, criminals are twice or thrice shielded.5 Criminal
origins are obscured by transferring funds to "paper corporations," which
in turn engage in financial transactions involving Swiss banks and other
financial institutions. The Swiss Federal Council is acutely aware of the
pre-laundering problem and other money laundering activities in Switzer-
land. 6
Some Swiss bankers deny that money laundering is still a real
problem in Switzerland.57 However, their view is limited, because money
laundering involves pre-laundering activities encompassing the entire
financial market. Therefore, although the direct transfer of funds of
criminal origin to Swiss banks may occur rarely today, the presence of
pre-laundering activities which include laundering in other countries
before reaching Switzerland is not easily recognizable to Swiss bankers.
A Financial Action Task Force (FATF) s study conducted in early 1993
openly criticized the laxity of Swiss law regulating activities outside of
the bank sector and stressed that corrective measures are needed. 9 As
move funds to Switzerland from the corporation instead of from an individual.
5 CLARKE & TIGUE, supra note 48, at 115.
I d. at 115.
The Swiss Federal Commission perceived the reason that money launderers espe-
cially choose Switzerland for their activities to be their recourse "to keepers of
professional secrets, to fallible individuals, to 'letter box' societies and to complex com-
mercial structures to confer to illegal values the appearance of legal profit." Message,
supra note 3, at 276. In addition to the international money laundering efforts previous-
ly described, the Federal Council is concerned about money laundering problems involv-
ing local drug markets. Profits from Swiss drug dealings generally are distributed by
individuals, recycled, and hidden in Swiss banks. Id.
' "Money laundering is not a problem any more in Switzerland. In this respect
Swiss legislation is 5-10 years behind. Tax evasion is the problem we deal with most
frequently now." Interview with Andre Lamprecht, Counsel, Legal Department of Credit
Suisse, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Interview with Lamprecht].
Andre Lamprecht is a member of the legal department of Credit Suisse, one of the
most prominent Swiss banks.
5 See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
5 The FATF points out that Switzerland is still lagging behind in the fight against
money laundering in the non-bank-sector. Friedmann Bartu, Beschwerlicher Kampf gegen
die Geldwdscherei; Jahresbericht der [Financial Action Task Force on Money Launder-
ing], NEUE ZURCHER ZEIrUNG, June 30, 1993, at 30 (translated by the author) (citing
Financial Action Task Force Report [hereinafter FATF Report]).
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early as 1984, the U.S. President's Commission on Organized Crime
warned that "every financial institution, including banks, savings and loan
institutions, currency exchange and casinos should assume that it is a
potential target for use by organized crime in money laundering
schemes."' However, money laundering is not the only problem Swiss
legislators are faced with. A related problem that faces Switzerland is
organized crime.
B. Organized Crime in Switzerland
A second abuse of Swiss banking secrecy is by organized crime.
Organized crime problems, such as small-time crime organizations, "the
turning plate of the service sector" and "the infiltration of the legal
economy" were found to be especially troublesome in large financial
districts such as Zrich, Geneva, and the Tessin. The Federal Council
established that legislation is needed to address the infiltration.6 Since
there are no statistics in Switzerland concerning cases of organized crime
specifically, examples must be used instead.62 However, the total crime
realized in Switzerland rose steadily from 310,930 cases in 1988 to
359,201 cases in 1991.'
The first manifestation of organized crime is described in the report
as "islands of 'basic criminal' organizations." These include structures
somewhere between criminal gangs and mafia-like organizations. Specifi-
cally, the Federal Council identified gangs that conceal or steal checks,
car thiefs,' and small-time drug traffickers.' Because these "islands of
criminality" do not control any large segment of Swiss society, the
Federal Council seems reassured that they will not have an influence on
60 ERNST KILGus & HEINZ ZIMMERMANN, BANKWIRTSCHAFTIJCHE KONSEQUENZEN
NEUERER RECHTSENTWICKLUNGEN [CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
ON THE BANKING MARKET] 86 (1992) (translated by author).
6' Raul Lautenschfitz, Das organisierte Verbrechen in der Schweiz;
Erscheinungsformen und Risiken [Organized Crime in Switzerland; The Forms in Which
It Appears and the Risks], NEUE ZORCHER ZErrUNG, July 1, 1993, at 19 (translated by
the author).
62 WERNER GRAF, ORGANISIERTE KRIMINALITAT [ORGANIZED CRIME] 27 (1993)
(translated by author).
63 Id. at 25.
Message, supra note 3, at 274.
The statistic for theft, generally, in Switzerland rose steadily since 1989 from
286,997 to 331,913 reported cases in 1991. GRAF, supra note 62, at 31.
66 The total cases reported as having violated the drug law rose from almost 6,000
cases in 1976 to almost 24,000 cases in 1991. Id. at 26; Message, supra note 3, at
274.
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19951 SWJ7ZERLAND EXCEPTIONS TO BANK SECRECY LAWS 331
the Swiss economy or on political decisions in Switzerland.67
Another manifestation of organized crime is "the turning plate in the
service sector," which is a reference to money laundering. 8 The Message
in which the new law was proposed mentions two groups of actors in the
sector of financial services. One group is comprised of people who are
ready to place the advantages of the Swiss financial market at the dispo-
sition of even suspect international clients.69 The other group is very
active as intermediaries on the gray market7 ° providing a great number
of contacts with organized crime, crime involving finance, and, in the
past, even with arms dealings.7' Scandals involving organized crime and
Swiss banking have previously included the "Pizza Connection"72 and the
"Lebanon Connection. ''" This manifestation of crime is interlinked with
banking and other financial secrecy problems in Switzerland in that
criminal funds in foreign currencies were easily transferred to Swiss
banks undetected, and thus gave no rise to any suspicion. Once they were
clients of Swiss banks, these criminal organizations were protected by
Swiss banking secrecy.
The most dangerous manifestation of organized crime in Switzerland
67 Lautenschiitz, supra note 61, at 20. This is at least not a serious problem when
compared to some of the southern neighboring countries to Switzerland. Protokol des
1.3.1994, StGB und MStG Strafbarkeit der kriminellen Organisation: Botschaft und
Gesetzentwtlrfe [Protocol of March 1, 1994 StGB and MStG Criminal Liability of the
Criminal Organizations: Message and Bills], June 30, 1993 at 2024 (translated by
author) [hereinafter Protokol 2].
' Message, supra note 3, at 275.
69 Id.
7 "The term 'gray market goods' is a loosely used expression intended to connote
any goods sold outside normal, authorized distribution channels." SETH E. LIPNER, THm
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC AsPEcrs OF GRAY MARKEr GOODS 1 (1990). Gray market
goods are distinguished from black market goods in that gray market goods are genuine
trademarked goods that are marketed without the local trademark owner's permission.
Id.
7' Message, supra note 3, at 275.
The "Pizza Connection" was a "heroin smuggling ring, uncovered in 1984. Prose-
cutors alleged that Swiss banks aided in the laundering of proceeds derived from the
sale of heroin ...... Baldwin & Munro, supra note 22, at 3; Message, supra note
3, at 277. See also SHANA ALEXANDER, THE PIZZA CONNECMION: LAWYERS, MONEY,
DRUGS, MAFIA (1988) (describing in depth the trial of the "Pizza Connections").
' In the "Lebanon Connection" "several of Switzerland's largest banks were alleged
to have aided in laundering approximately one billion dollars over a two-year period.
The subsequent investigation led to the resignation of the Swiss Justice Minister."
Baldwin & Munro, supra note 22, at 3. See also Swiss to Expel Lebanese Brothers
Jailed for Money-laundering, Reuter World Service, July 6, 1991, at 1, available in
LEXIS, WORLD Library, REUWLD File.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
according to the Federal Council is the "infiltration of the legal econo-
my."74 This problem has so far not manifested itself in Switzerland.'
The reason for the Federal Council's concern is the possibility that Swiss
enterprises in financial difficulty may become dependent on funding from
organized crime which would enable the criminal organization to partici-
pate in Swiss enterprises in the future.76 As an example, the Federal
Council points to foreign countries such as Italy where, in hindsight, it
became clear that the determining factor that enabled a criminal organiza-
tion to widen its influence on a foreign country's politics and economy
was such a dependency by enterprises. 7 Switzerland is not alone in its
fear of waves of criminal activity; such activities are an international
concern.
C. International Pressure to Relax Swiss Banking Secrecy Laws
Switzerland realized that in order to combat money laundering
effectively, cooperation between states is necessary." In the world com-
munity, there is a trend toward lifting bank secrecy more easily than in
the past, "particularly in view of the growing need for transnational
cooperation in combating international and organized crime."'79 The world
community also expects Switzerland to respect certain requirements in
connection with international cooperation and joint development. The
international pressure on Switzerland to change its banking secrecy laws
includes pressure from the United States, the European Community and
the FATF, all of which perceive the Swiss financial market as being
under-regulated and in need of stronger anti-money laundering mea-
sures.
80
Criticism by the United States of Swiss banking secrecy has been
strong. Switzerland entered in to the Swiss-U.S. Treaty Concerning
Assistance in Criminal Matters in 197581 in an attempt to grant the
' The infiltration of the legal economy refers to infiltration of organized crime into
the legal, political, and economic communities of Switzerland. Message, supra note 3,
at 275.
75 Id.
76 Id.
'n Lautenschfitz, supra note 61, at 20 (citing Message, supra note 3).
78 Message, supra note 3, at 312; Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 18, at 541. "In
view of the international intertwining of the economy and business life, namely the
expansion of the business arena, the deregulation, the increasing mobility, but also the
compulsion to migrate, it is not surprising that crime is organizing itself increasingly
internationally." Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 82.
79 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 696.
s See discussion infra Section VI.C.
sI Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27
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United States assistance in its criminal investigations. However, the
United States was not able to compel disclosure of protected bank records
unless the criminal offense the United States was investigating also was
considered a crime in Switzerland.' Money laundering was not consid-
ered a crime in Switzerland prior to 1990.83 Due to the difficulty of
obtaining confidential banking information from the Swiss government
and the banking community, the United States pressured Switzerland to
enact legislation making money laundering a crime in Switzerland.84 As
a result, Article 305bi, of the Swiss Penal Code was enacted in 1990,
which granted U.S. prosecutors access to bank records protected by
banking secrecy for the prosecution of money launderers.' This change
somewhat appeased U.S. pressure, but the relaxing of Swiss banking
secrecy laws further eased U.S. investigations of money laundering of-
fenses in Switzerland.
Pressure from E.C. members concerning Swiss banking secrecy
legislation is interlinked with pressure on Switzerland to join the E.C.
Current E.C. members studied the money laundering situation and mea-
sures that could be taken against money laundering world-wide. A direc-
tive was advanced in the E.C. that promoted the creation of a right and
an obligation to communicate for bankers.86 An interdepartmental group
specifically concerning Switzerland was established under the direction of
the Federal Department of Finance with the mandate to propose legisla-
tion that could be introduced to Switzerland that would satisfy the
requirements of the aforementioned directive.' The group envisioned the
introduction of an obligation to communicate for the entire Swiss finan-
cial sector.88
The FATF,"9 which is part of the Organization for Economic Coop-
U.S.T. 2019.
82 Id.
' Kanwar M. Singh, Note, Nowhere to Hide: Judicial Assistance in Piercing the
Veil of Swiss Banking Secrecy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 847, 848 (1991).
84 Id.
' PENAL CODE art. 305bl (Switz.); Singh, supra note 83, at 848.
86 Council Directive 91/38 of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of the
Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77.
87 Id.
Id. The interdepartmental group finished its work on the project in March, 1993.
89 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF, or GAFI in French) issues an annual
report on the state of anti-money laundering measures worldwide. Annual FATF Report
Puts Eight Countries Under Microscope, MoNEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Aug., 1993, at
7 [hereinafter Annual FATF Report]. Part of its 1992-93 report focused on money
laundering legislation and measures adopted in eight of its member countries (which
now number 26) Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland,
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eration and Development based in Paris, was formed in 1989 by the G-
7.'0 Switzerland is a member of the FATF. In February 1990, the FATF
presented forty recommendations concerning the use of the financial
sector for the purposes of money laundering. Among these, recommenda-
tion Number 16 advocated the creation of a right or obligation of com-
munication for the financier. 9' The FATF has applauded Switzerland's
efforts in combatting money laundering'. This praise was tempered,
however, by their criticism that Switzerland has not done enough to curb
money laundering in the non-banking sector of the Swiss financial
market.93
D. The Elimination of the Dilemma Created by Article 305' of the
Penal Code
Two distinguishing situations can arise in which criminal activity
may be brought to the banker's attention. In one situation the banking
relationship has not yet been established and there is no dilemma because
the banking secrecy privilege has not yet been established.94 The banker
can refuse the client or inform the authorities without criminal liability.95
However, in the second, more frequent situation banking relationships
have already been established. The banker's dilemma arises in this
situation.
Article 305' of the Penal Code, 6 enacted in 1990, created a dilem-
ma for bankers in Switzerland.97 Bankers found themselves in a situation
and the United States. Id. Forty recommendations for combatting money laundering
were adopted by the group in 1990. Id. The FATF evaluation focuses on the imple-
mentation of these measures. Id.
9 Id. G-7 stands for the "group of seven major industrialized countries." Id.
9' Message, supra note 3, at 313 (citing Rapport du GAFI du 7 fevrier 1990
[Report of the FAFT of Feb. 7, 1990], at 20); Baldwin & Munro, supra note 22, at
9.
9 Annual FATF Report, supra note 89, at 313.
93 Id.
9" Message, supra note 3, at 316.
9- Id. at 315.
96 PENAL CODE art. 305" (Switz.). See also discussion infra Section V.C.
9 Message, supra note 3, at 270.
The Swiss Federal Banking Commission enunciated the conflicts of interest involved:
It [the bank] has to weigh up on the one hand:
- the violation of the customer's trust by a suspicion that may later prove unfounded;
- the risk of the bank's liability for damages under civil law if it delays, or fails to
implement, a customer's instructions to withdraw assets until it receives appropriate no-
tification from the competent authorities.
and on the other hand:
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where if they reported suspicions of criminal activity involving financial
transactions, they could be held criminally liable for violating banking
secrecy, according to Article 47 of the Banking Code. But if they failed
to communicate such a belief to the authorities, they could also be
criminally liable for money laundering under Article 305' of the Penal
Code.98 Bankers cannot invoke any legal defense to justify communicat-
ing suspicionsY Specifically, bankers can neither invoke a legal obliga-
tion nor a duty of the function of the profession nor a legitimate legal
defense."°° There is, however, some disagreement among the legal aca-
demics in Switzerland concerning other non-legal defenses which could be
asserted.' Because of the lack of legal defenses, however, bankers who
find themselves in the aforementioned dilemma have no legal "out."
A right to communicate solves the dilemma presented here and
allows the banker to escape criminal liability for violating banking se-
crecy. According to one member of the National Council, the only way
to eliminate the Swiss financier's dilemma is to provide the financier the
right to communicate substantiated suspicions to the authorities. This
change is included in the new law."°
V. PREvIOus ATrEMPTS AT CHANGING SwIss BANKING SECRECY AND
REASONS FOR THEIR INEFFECTIVENESS
By entering into innovative international agreements and by modify-
ing its own laws concerning money laundering, Swiss legislators aspired
to lead Europe in combatting money laundering. 3 In the process, Swiss
legislators are torn between considerations of federalism, legal protection,
- the risk that the officers and employees of the bank may themselves be liable to
prosecution for money laundering under the terms of Art. 305' of the Swiss Penal
Code, if, despite its suspicions, the bank pursues the business relationship or terminates
it but allows assets to be withdrawn without taking further steps, thereby making it
objectively difficult to locate and/or collect the assets in question;
- the public interest in exposing money laundering which suggests that the bank submit
a report to the criminal investigation authorities.
The conclusion to which the Banking Commission came was that the law as it
stands does not resolve the question. Swiss Federal Banking Commission, Guidelines for
Combating and Prevention of Money Laundering (Dec. 18, 1991) [hereinafter SFBC
Guidelines].
" Message, supra note 3, at 270.
9 As anticipated by PENAL CODE arts. 32-34 (Switz.)
100 Message, supra note 3, at 315.
... See infra notes 225-41 and accompanying text concerning Gunther Arzt and the
"Pflichtenkollision" [collision of duty] defense.
'2 Protokol 2, supra note 67, at 2023.
03 Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 89.
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and efficiency." However, repeatedly legislators have overcome these
difficulties because of the strong consensus in Switzerland that its image
needs to be maintained internationally. l" Legislation and agreements that
have attempted to address money laundering problems in Switzerland
include international treaties, '0 private agreements between Swiss
bankers,"° and Swiss legislation0 8 dating back to 1905. Much of this
legislation, however, has either been ineffective in changing Swiss bank-
ing secrecy laws, has created conflicts within Swiss law, or has created
new obligations for the banker that the Swiss legal system is not
equipped to handle.
A. Treaties Concerning Assistance in International Matters and
Commitment to Combat Money Laundering
1. The Hague Convention on Civil Procedure
International judicial assistance involved in this area can be traced
back to the Hague Convention of 1905."° The Hague Convention on
Civil Procedure provided that bank secrecy questions concerning Switzer-
land should be resolved domestically. According to the Convention, if
foreign authorities want to obtain information protected by banking
secrecy from Switzerland, they must request official assistance from a
Swiss judge."0 These requests are then to be executed according to the
Swiss cantonal law concerning procedure."' On its face the Hague
Convention on Civil Procedure addressed only procedure, not the substan-
tive law of Swiss banking secrecy.
2. Swiss-U.S. Treaty Concerning Assistance in Criminal Matters
Because of the difficulties of obtaining information concerning Swiss
banking, the United States perceived the need to take special measures to
relax the stringency of the Swiss secrecy laws in the 1970s, especially
concerning U.S. criminal investigations. The Swiss-U.S. Treaty Concern-
104 Id.
105 id.
'o See discussion infra Section V.A.1-3.
o See discussion infra Section V.B.
,o See discussion infra Section V.C.
o Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 18, at 552 (citing The Hague Convention
Relating to Civil Procedure, July 17, 1905 (codified as RS O.274.12 and revised in
1957) [hereinafter The Hague]).
2,0 Dunant & Wassmer, supra note 18, at 552.
,. The Hague, supra note 109, art. 14.
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ing Assistance in Criminal Matters was signed on May 25, 1975 for that
purpose."' The treaty contains two relevant parts. The first part con-
cerns "General Assistance" which provides for Swiss cooperation in
criminal matters where foreign states have an interest. The second part
provides for a special procedure which is intended to facilitate the pros-
ecution of what is described as "organized groups of criminals.' ' . It is
in this treaty that Switzerland for the first time defined what should be
considered as a criminal organization in Switzerland."' As discussed
previously, many practical difficulties arose with this treaty."5
3. European Agreement on Money Laundering, 1993
In 1993, Switzerland ratified the European Accord on Fighting
Money Laundering." 6 The Accord obliges the signatories to actively
prevent and punish money laundering offenses. The first part of the treaty
defines a national minimum standard concerning ascertainment, confisca-
tion, and impoundment of funds with illegal origins. The signatories are
bound to create penal law provisions against money laundering. To this
end, the treaty ensures international cooperation in matters of ascertain-
ment, confiscation, and impoundment.
1 7
The Council of Europe, a twenty-seven nation pan-European Group
which aims to protect human rights and freedoms and increase European
cooperation, drew up the Agreement, which is an indication of the strong
commitment among European countries to find a comprehensive interna-
tional solution to the remaining money laundering problems."' The
effects of this agreement have yet to be realized; however, it did provide
the basis and impetus for Swiss legislators to reform the internal legal
1' Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra note 81.
13 "[Elach party to the Treaty attempts to grant assistance to the other in investiga-
tions and court proceedings for criminal offenses, the punishment of which falls within
the jurisdiction of the authorities of the requesting state." Dunant & Wassmer, supra
note 18, at 557.
"" Protokol 2, supra note 67, at 2025.
"15 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
116 It came into effect September 1, 1993. Ubereinkommen Nr. 141 des Europarates
fiber Geldwascherei sowie Ermittlung, Beschlagnahme und Einziehung von Ertragen aus
Straftaten, Sept. 1, 1993, Council of Europe, Switz. BBI 1992 VI, at 9 [hereinafter
European Agreement]; Switzerland Ratifies Accord on Money Laundering, Reuter
European Community Report, May 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library,
REUEC File. Switzerland was the third country to sign after Great Britain and Germa-
ny.
"' European Agreement, supra note 116.
118 Id.
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mechanisms to combat money laundering more effectively."'
B. Swiss Bankers' Agreements
1. Swiss Bankers' Association Agreements
The Swiss banking community took it upon itself to enact an
agreement for the purpose of preventing illegal activities relating to
banking. In 1977 Swiss banks, through the SBA,'" entered into the
Agreement of Observance of Care.' This agreement concerns the ac-
cepting of funds and the practice of banking services. Mainly, the agree-
ment requires banks to know the identity of their clients, to refuse funds
with criminal origin and to avoid assisting in capital flight or tax fraud
matters."2 This agreement does not affect bank secrecy in scope or ex-
tent, it simply provides guidelines to avoid criminal problems altogeth-
In 1992, this Agreement was renewed in the Agreement on the Swiss
Banks' Code of Conduct with Regard to the Exercise of Due Dili-
gence. 24 This updated version of the agreement provides clear guide-
lines for banks when the relationship with the client has not yet been
established."z Additional guidelines prohibit providing active assistance
in the flight of capital and cases of tax evasion. These guidelines, howev-
er, do not clarify what degree of knowledge is required for a bank to
refuse services and what, other than the refusing services, banks should
do in case of such a discovery. 2 6
"9 Id. at 13; Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 85.
'2 The Swiss Bankers' Association (Schweizerische Bankvereinigung) is the most
important trade organization in the banking field in Switzerland. Presidents, vice-pres-
idents, delegates, managers, and deputy managers of banks and bank-like financial or-
ganizations, private bankers, and partners of firms admitted to stock exchanges are
offered membership. The association "devotes itself to the protection of the rights
interests of the banking trade in general, as well as the interests of the Swiss investor
in particular, especially in foreign countries." HANS J. BAR & DANIEL U. ALBRECHT,
THE BANKING SYSTEM OF SwrrzERLAND 40-41 (1973). Recently, the Association
described its duties: "the Swiss Bankers Association in its capacity as the professional
body charged with safeguarding the interests and reputation of Swiss banking." SBA
AGREEMENT, supra note 41 (emphasis added).
121 Swiss BANKERS' ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT OF OBSERVANCE OF CARE (1977).
12 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 695.
123 Id. at 696.
124 SBA AGREEMENT, supra note 41.
125 Id.
'26 Id.
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2. Swiss Federal Banking Commission Guidelines
The Swiss Federal Banking Commission27 also issued a directive
which eliminated anonymous bank accounts by September, 1992." s To-
day, Form A accounts require the contracting parties to affrmn that they
are the beneficial owners, or in the alternative, to disclose the identity of
the beneficial owner.'29 Although the directive "increased vigilance" in
the banking sector, the SBA stated that Swiss banking secrecy itself was
not materially changed in content or significance."3 This belief is large-
ly due to the fact that in the guidelines do not provide for a legal
obligation to report suspicious activity once the contracting relationship
has been entered into. Additionally, neither the elimination of Form B or
the enactment of Article 305js and 305' affected the non-bank sector of
the marketplace in any way.'
C. Swiss Law On Money Laundering: Article 305b and 305'r of the
Swiss Penal Code
Article 30 5"s and 305' of the Swiss Penal Code were enacted in
1990 in an attempt to appease U.S. and domestic pressure.' The effect
of Article 3 05bs was to criminalize money laundering proceeds, which
according to Swiss law derived from any felony criminal activity.'
Article 305' was to punish individuals who assist in these money laun-
dering schemes by failing to establish the identities of beneficial owners
'1' The Swiss Federal Banking Commission (Eidgen6ssische Bankenkommission EBK)
represents all Swiss banks and publishes the FEDERAL BANKING COMMISSION BULLETIN.
On important legal and banking issues the Commission issues directives or guidelines
to be followed by all banks. Membership is largely made up of previous bank directors
and business attorneys. ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 98. The EBK has been criticized as
only wielding symbolic power in the banking field today. ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 98.
" SFBC Guidelines, supra note 97. This involved the elimination of the infamous
Form B or numbered accounts.
' Baldwin & Munro, supra note 22, at 5; Singh, supra note 83, at 860; Taisch,
supra note 47.
130 Baldwin & Munro, supra note 22, at 5; Taisch, supra note 129; Pierard &
Killen, supra note 30; Singh, supra note 83, at 860.
'' The Federal Commission addressed this fact in the Message by stating: "[it
would be suitable to promote .. . vigilance in the entire financial sector." Message,
supra note 3, at 276.
23' Taisch, supra note 129.
13 PENAL CODE art. 30 5b (Switz.); Baldwin & Munro, supra note 22, at 4, 5;
Taisch, supra note 129; Pierard & Killen, supra note 30; Singh, supra note 83, at 853-
55.
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of accounts in their individual professions. 3 1 This provision has also
been termed the "due diligence" provision requiring financial professionals
to be held to that standard. Although, the Swiss Federal Council conclud-
ed that the legislation was effective in increasing the care with which
bankers accept clients and deal with their accounts, 35 it has not yet
reached its expected potential in fighting money laundering. The main
problem is that "only small, thin fish are being caught in the net and not
the fat financial sharks.' ' 36 Additionally, Article 305' of the Penal
Code 137 creates a conflict for the Swiss financier when combined with
Article 47 of the Banking Code.'38
D. Summary
One result of the heavy international and national legislation in this
area is the creation of legal inconsistencies and conflicts. The danger that
inconsistencies may arise necessitates a constant review of the current
statutory law by Swiss legislators. For example, the Guidelines for the
Combating and Prevention of Money Laundering of the Swiss Federal
Banking Commission and the 1992 Agreement of the Swiss Bankers
Association both required bankers to engage in conduct that inevitably led
them to an increased awareness of suspicious activity that may be of a
criminal nature. 39 The question that then confronted the bankers was
what to do with the information they obtained. Since the enactment of
Article 305', the danger of criminal liability for money laundering faced
'34 PENAL CODE art. 305 (Switz.); Baldwin & Munro, supra note 22, at 4, 5;
Taisch, supra note 129; Pierard & Killen, supra note 30; Singh, supra note 83, at 853-
55.
'31 The Federal Council recognizes that "[tihe penal legislation relative to money
laundering and the directive of the Federal Banking Commission for the combat and
prevention of money laundering have contributed in a sensible manner to increase the
vigilance in the banking sector principally." Message, supra note 3, at 276.
'36 Protokol 2, supra note 67, at 2025. The first important cases concerning Art.
305' money laundering include a judgment from the criminal court in Bern on July 19,
1991 (in which the amount of money involved came to SFr. 5,000); a judgment of the
Kassationshof at the Federal court on January 20, 1993, BGE 119 IV 59 (which
involved SFr. 120,000); and a judgment of the same court on September 22, 1993,
BGE 119 IV 242 (which involved SFr. 205,000). J6rg Gillessen, Die Straftatbestande
der Geldwascherei (Art. 305b" und 305' StGB) at 4 (May 1994) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author).
137 PENAL CODE art. 305 (Switz.) provides for criminal liability of bankers involved
in money laundering.
' Federal Banking Law, art. 47 (Switz.) creates criminal liability of bankers who
reveal banking secrecy. See discussion supra Section IV.D.
,3 Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 88; Protokol 2, supra note 67, at 2030.
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bankers. Therefore, careful bankers observing their duty under the law,
the Guidelines and the Agreement had no safe means to transfer the use-
ful information they obtained. Additionally, new international agreements
such as the European Agreement 1993,"4 created the obligation for
Swiss legislators to live up to the international commitment made and to
reform Swiss domestic laws accordingly. 4' Assuring domestic legal
consistency is the only means by which Switzerland can maintain its
image as an internationally responsible country.
VI. THE NEW LAW: ARTICLE 305ter, MARGINAL NOTE, AND SECOND
PARAGRAPH
In an effort to keep Swiss law modem and to eliminate conflict with
other Swiss domestic law and international agreements, Swiss legislators
proposed the amendment to Article 305'.42 The Swiss Parliament enact--
ed the new law on August 1, 1994. The new law provides:
Marginal Note: want of vigilance in financial operations and the right to
communicate.
Second Paragraph: The persons designated by the first paragraph143
[Art. 305tJ, have the right to communicate observations that enable the
conclusion, that assets were the proceeds of a crime to the interior
authorities of penal pursuit and to the federal authorities designated by
law.1"
Basically, financiers have the right to communicate substantiated suspi-
cions of criminal activity involving their financial institutions to Swiss
authorities. A discussion of the process of enacting the new law and a
detailed explanation of its terms and its projected effectiveness follow.
A. Legislative History: the Decision-Making Process in Switzerland
The Swiss decision-making process is unlike that of most other
party-based parliamentary democracies in that decisions are not primarily
enacted in Parliament and the cantons and special interest groups custom-
arily have a great deal of influence. 45 Interest groups that participate in
"4 European Agreement, supra note 116.
... Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 99.
142 Message, supra note 3, at 277.
'4 See discussion supra Section V.C. for definition of persons.
14 PENAL CODE art. 305m' Marginal Note and Para. 2 (Switz.).
Jirg Steiner, Switzerland, in PoLrIcs IN WEsTERN EUROPE 296, 320 (Gerald A.
Dorfman & Peter J. Duignen eds., 1991).
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the pre-parliamentary phase of drafting a proposal usually have representa-
fives who participate in the parliamentary phase as members of Parlia-
ment."4 There are three distinct stages in the Swiss decision-making
process: pre-parliamentary, parliamentary, and referendum stages. 47
1. Pre-parliamentary Stage
In the pre-parliamentary stage, an expert committee drafts a bill.
Representatives of special interest groups in favor of or opposed to the
proposed bill usually compose such a committee."4 This way, those
whom the legislation will affect are represented and those who have
special technical knowledge in the area being legislated are involved.'49
In this case, Deputy to the Council of States first asked the Federal
Council for its opinion on the problem of organized crime in Switzer-
land. '5 The Federal Council then charged the Federal Office of Justice
on September 11, 1989 to direct an interdepartmental group to examine
measures that could be taken concerning money laundering.' Following
the group's proposal that suggested a right to communication, a consul-
tation between all the cantons was conducted. All the cantons and the
federal tribunal, which participated in the consultation,' came to a
consensus approving of the right to communication.'
Before reaching the parliamentary stage, the Federal Council re-
viewed the results of the consultation and instructed the Federal Depart-
ment of Justice and Police to elaborate on proposed legislation and to
solicit the opinion of the Expert Committee which had been charged by
the Federal Council with revising the Penal Code.' The Federal Coun-
cil has little leeway in this process. Special interest groups and associa-
tions influence the decision as to who should be appointed to an Expert
Committee.'55 Although deliberations of Expert Committees always
proceed behind closed doors and may take many different forms, the goal
"4 Id. at 319. "This is in sharp contrast to the American system, where the place
of special interest groups is to lobby Congress itself." Id.
'4 Id. at 317.
148 Id. at 318.
149 Id.
"5 Message, supra note 3, at 269.
... Id. at 271.
152 The duration of the consultation was from March 11 to June 30, 1991. Id. at
279.
,51 Id. at 280-82 (several cantons even advocated an obligation of communication).
154 Id. at 285.
"' Steiner, supra note 145, at 318.
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usually is to reach a consensus among the participants.'56 The partici-
pants of the Expert Committee discussing the bill in this case, contem-
plated an eventual transformation of the right to communicate into an
obligation to communicate. They decided, however, that the obligation to
communicate would be too harsh and made no material modification to
the project. 7
2. Parliamentary Stage
After the Expert Committee reports to the Federal Council, the
Federal Council submits the draft bill to Parliament.'58 If a consensus
has been reached in the pre-parliamentary stage then Parliament will
usually approve the consensus. 9 One reason for this is that many spe-
cial interest group representatives on the Expert Committees are also
members of Parliament."6 In the case of the new law, the Expert Com-
mittee charged with examining and elaborating on it did come to a con-
sensus."' On December 9, 1993 the Canton Council' discussed and
voted on the proposal. The proposal was approved unanimously.63 Since
the new law was drafted by members of the banking community, was
approved of by the banking community, and largely affects the banking
community, the likelihood of it also passing in the National Council"'
was great."
"6 Id. at 319.
" They held that holding someone criminally liable for negligent money laundering
was too harsh. Message, supra note 3, at 287. The protocols of the discussion are,
however, not available since discussions were conducted behind closed doors. Letter
from Jean-Claude Hoyz, Document Center, Swiss Federal Assembly, (Nov. 23, 1993)
(on file with author).
' Steiner, supra note 145, at 319.
J If no consensus is reached by the Expert Committee, Parliament will have to
decide between the opposing positions. The political parties (Free Democrats, Social
Democrats, Christian democrats, Swiss People's Party, and some minor parties) will take
an official position and the vote may be close. See id. at 319.
160 Id.
161 Message, supra note 3, at 287; Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 89.
162 The Canton Council, or "Stnderat" in German, is a chamber of Parliament.
" The vote was unanimously in favor by 21 votes, but since this was not a
majority of all the members (there are 44 StAnderat members) there had to be a second
vote at which 23 members unanimously voted in favor of the bill. Protokol 1, supra
note 40, at 138.
'64 National Council is called the Nationalrat in German.
' Discussion took place in the Nationalrat (which is the similar to the House of
Representatives in the United States) in the Spring of 1994. Letter from Hoyz, supra
note 157.
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On March 2, 1994, the bill was approved in the National Council.
The vote and discussion of the National Council was significant in that
the alternative, the obligation to communicate, was voted on as well as
the proposed right to communicate.'" The minority that argued for the
obligation to communicate, raised several arguments. One argument was
that the right to communicate is less than what was suggested by the
international community who urged the obligation to communicate and
Switzerland would appear to be lagging. 67 The other argument was that
the right to communicate still leaves financiers all the options, even if
they have substantiated suspicion that funds may have a criminal origin.
The obligation to communicate on the other hand, would provide clarity
and coherence as to the financiers duties. 6 The majority countered that
Swiss legislators should take one step at a time. The main problem with
enacting a duty to communicate at the time of the National Council's
discussions was that no guidelines had been prepared as to how the
obligation to communicate was to function, and what the exact require-
ments and sanctions would be.'69 If the obligation to communicate had
been enacted in August, 1994, it would have been considered a "lex
imperfecta" in Switzerland. Significant, however, is the commitment Swiss
legislators are showing to continue the fight against money laundering
even to the point of eliminating Swiss banking secrecy entirely by
providing for an obligation to communicate. 7
3. Referendum Stage
Should there prove to be opposition in the National Council to a bill,
a national referendum may be held.'7' This process involves referendum
campaigns which constitute a battle between the active interest groups.
Again, political parties usually play only a secondary role." The dead-
line for a Referendum concerning the new law was July 4, 1994. No
referendum was held, and the law is currently in force.
'" Protokol 2, supra note 67, at 3007. The duty to communicate received a minority
of 58 votes, and the right to communicate received 101 votes. None was opposed.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
371 See generally Bundesgesetz zur Bekampfung der Geldwischerei im Finanzsektor,
GwG Vorentwurf [Federal Law to Combat Money Laundering in the Financial Sector,
GwG Draft] (Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss Money Laundering Draft Preamble].
171 Steiner, supra note 145, at 320.
172 Id.
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B. Comment on the Law
Although Federal Court decisions may further elucidate the meaning
of the new law, its provisions currently must be examined in light of the
language of the Message, discussions in the Canton Council, and discus-
sions in the National Council. The following closely examines the entire
language of the new law, and attempts to clarify what will be required of
financiers in order to assert their right to communicate. With the excep-
tion of a few minor ambiguities, the new law is clearly defined on is
face.
1. Persons Designated by the First Paragraph
"Persons designated by the first paragraph" is defined by the Federal
Council as "persons working in banks, financial institutions, fiduciaries,
those operating in auction sales as well as placed consultants, financial
administrators, foreign exchange officers, sellers of precious metals and
business advocates."'" This includes the bank sector and the non-bank
sector which comprise the financial market in Switzerland. For the first
time, non-bankers are included in Swiss measures taken against money
laundering." In the Canton Council discussions, the question was raised
whether attorneys are included in this description.'75 Minister of Justice
Koller clarified that attorneys are only included in the provision insofar
as they are acting as business attorneys dealing with estate planning of
financial assets. 7 ' Any traditional attorney activities are not included in
the right to communicate, which means that attorney confidentiality is
completely unaffected by the new law."
2. The Right to Communicate
Financiers have "the right" to communicate."' Basically, the Feder-
al Council defines this right as resolving the conflict which currently
exists in the law between the banking secrecy laws and the possibility of
being criminally liable for money laundering. The new law allows a
" Message, supra note 3, at 316. The persons described here will hereinafter be
broadly referred to as "financiers.'
174 Id.
" Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 109.
176 Id.
" Id. Article 321 of the Swiss Penal Code is the provision punishing the violation
of professional secrecy. PENAL CODE art. 321 (Switz.).
" Message, supra note 3, at 322.
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financier to report suspected criminal activity in the financial market,
which under current law can lead to criminal liability. This reporting is
necessary to advance the policy to which Swiss law makers have commit-
ted themselves; combatting organized crime and money laundering.
179
Even if financiers wrongly claim that funds were derived from a crime,
they cannot be held criminally liable.' The right in and of itself elimi-
nates the duty of a banker to maintain confidence in all cases.
3. Right to Communicate
The new law provides the financier with the right to "communicate."
In describing the type of communication, the Federal Council specifies
here that because of possible future investigation or litigation it is neces-
sary that the financier be able to offer proof supporting the communica-
tion to the competent authority at the time of the communication.''
Simple accusations are not sufficient. Financiers must be prepared to
verify and document any claim they wish to make of suspected criminal
activity.
4. Communicating Observations
Financiers may communicate "the observations that enable the
conclusion that assets were the proceeds of a crime."'' 2 The Federal
Council points out that not just any information is to be transmitted to
authorities, but only "that which permits 'establishing that assets origi-
nated from a crime."" 83 Examples of "observations" reported are perti-
nent observations, questions, doubts, and all other useful information to
establish proof' 84 These examples indicate that more than an unsubstan-
tiated suspicion, but less than certainty, is required to report to the
authority; the new law does not require knowledge. Exactly what level of
suspicion is necessary is not specified.'85 By "observations" the Federal
7 Id. at 316. "The right accorded by the present disposition . . . intends . . . only
the justification of a comportment in itself penally reprehensible - of knowing the
violation of the banking secret . . . - and illicit to the civil plan, being in violation of
obligations of discretion of the agent." Id. at 316.
's" Id. at 317. The Message does not specify what level of mistake is allowed. It
could be only negligence or even intentional wrong claims.
18, Id. at 317.
19 Id. at 322.
'8 Id. at 317.
1984 Id. at 317.
" Gifnther Arzt claims that the Message leaves so much uncertainty as to what
level of suspicion is required that only a "logical second" exists in which a banker can
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Council does not mean proof in a strict sense nor simple vague im-
pressions but something "founded on suspicion" that can be brought
before the authorities.'86
"Assets" which are involved in the financial transaction the financier
considered suspicious should be interpreted in a broad sense. "It also
encompasses currencies, titles, the rights of trusts/credit in general, metals
and precious stones, works of art, all other sorts of personal property as
well as real estate and the rights attached to it.""' Again, the Federal
Council intended this term to expand the means of combatting money
laundering beyond the bank sector to the rest of the Swiss financial
market.
5. Reporting Suspicious Assets
The report is to be made to "interior authorities of penal pursuit and
to the federal authorities designated by the law."'88 The Federal Council
does not want to" define this too narrowly, as authority structures may
change.' As it stands, difficulties may easily arise in practical applica-
tion if state authorities, for example, have no training or experience for
dealing with the kind of information banks may provide them. The
Federal Council recognizes this potential difficulty. The Canton Council
discussed a proposal for the creation of a Central Station specializing in
the combat of organized crime. This Central Station would be assigned
the duty of coordinating data concerning organized crime and providing
contacts to foreign service areas."9 They could then dispatch their own
police liaison officer to important foreign destinations.' Priorities in-
clude Washington or Lyon (Interpol) through which information could
efficiently be exchanged."9
According to the Message "[w]hatever will be the future evolution of
safely report suspicions. See infra notes 224-240 and accompanying text. This has been
the major source of criticism of this new law. Glinter Stratenwerth, Geldwdscherei- ein
Lehrstiick der Gesetzgebung [Money Laundering - A Lesson in Legislation], in
BEKAM PFUNG DER GELDW.SCHEmR 99, 114 (Mark Pieth ed., 1992). However, in
practical application the financier is not likely to bother reporting suspicions that are
unfounded. The observations that made him/her suspicious to begin with are likely to
suffice.
"6 Message, supra note 3, at 317.
197 Id.
I Id. at 322.
189 Id.
"9 Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 99.
191 Id.
19 Id.
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the structures for the prevention and the repression of crime, fiscal,
customs authorities, or the police of foreign countries are not included
among the destinations of the communication."' 19 3 The report is to be
made to Swiss authorities and only to Swiss authorities. The new law is
not designed to aid foreign countries in their investigations, but only to
aid Swiss authorities in combatting money laundering and organized
crime.
6. Summary
The main problem with the language of the new law is its vagueness
concerning the amount of suspicion and proof that is required.'94 The
Federal Council probably intended the question to be resolved by the
federal or cantonal courts applying the law. The language of the new law
clearly defines the most important terms of the provision, which are the
legal right to communicate and the classification of who has that
right.95 The details of the right to communicate are simply left to the
courts to decide in their cases of first impression under this law.
C. The New Law Is Properly Tailored to Meet the Needs
1. Curbing Money Laundering Activities in Switzerland
As noted above bankers did not report money laundering after the
passage of the 1990 legislation creating Article 305' and 305' because
they could be held criminally liable for violating Article 47 of the
Banking Code protecting banking information if their conclusion that
money laundering activity was taking place proved wrong." The new
law eliminates this problem by providing financiers the right to communi-
cate signs of money laundering to Swiss authorities in order that false
suspicions will not be criminally punishable."9
The new law also solves the problem of money laundering in the
non-banking sector of the Swiss financial market. As discussed earlier, the
bulk of the money laundering activities in Switzerland is conducted
through pre-laundering activities."' The Federal Council clearly estab-
lishes that the entire Swiss financial market is conferred the right to
communicate in the new law by providing the non-bank sector with the
193 Id.
1 See discussion supra Section VI.B.
195 Id.
"9 Message, supra note 3, at 270.
191 Id. at 322.
98 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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same right the bank sector is provided."9 The language in the Message
and the Federal Council's Comment specifically addresses the problem
areas perceived in money laundering activities in Switzerland. Thus, the
new law may help curb money laundering.'
However, whether the new law will curb money laundering is a
different question. One Swiss banker" 1 perceives problems with the
practical application of the law.' Mainly, he cautioned that there may
be a reluctance by bankers to report suspicious activities, since a thorough
investigation by Swiss authorities is sure to follow. 3 Such an investiga-
tion may easily lead to suspicions of the banker's own involvement in
money laundering.' Legal departments at banks will choose the option
which is least likely to expose the bank to risks. °5 The inference to be
drawn from these statements is that only highly suspicious activity is
likely to be reported.
Another conceivable problem is that if the financial professionals
report mere suspicions, it may lead to difficulties for completely innocent
clients. The prevailing fear of the obligation to communicate, which also
applies to the right to communicate, is that financiers might become
investigators and an extension of law enforcement in Switzerland.'
'" Message, supra note 3, at 316. An additional indication that all financiers have
a right to communicate is the definition of "assets" in the Comment, which includes
values that would be dealt with by non-bank institutions. Id. at 318.
20 An interesting trend in the fight against money laundering is that the emphasis
has been on criminal law rules. Mario Giovanoli, Switzerland: Some Recent Develop-
ments in Banking Law, in EUROPEAN BANKING LAW: THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELA-
TIONSHIP 183, 198 (Ross Carnston ed., 1993). The main Article enforcing banking
secrecy is not in the criminal code, but rather in Article 47 of the Banking Code. This
is an indication that money laundering is often considered to be part of larger criminal
activities, such as drug and arms dealings. Also, the main effect of the laws (Article
305 and the Message) is to be retributive rather than preventive. See id. Finally, how-
ever, it seems that although criminalizing money laundering was an agent in fighting
money laundering, the best results will be obtained by relying on the prudent behavior
of financial professionals. Id. In general, it seems that one problem concerning money
laundering in Switzerland has been the belief of the general public that Criminal law
rules would be sufficient to fight money laundering. Im Kampf gegen die Geldwiischerei
Oberschiitzte Mdglichkeiten des Strafrechts [Overestimated Possibilities of the Penal
Code in the War Against Money Laundering], NEuB ZURCHER ZErruNG, July 8, 1992.
20 Interview with Lamprecht, supra note 57.
2M Id.
23 Id.
X4 Id.
SId.
Giovanoli, supra note 200, at 197.
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However, since such behavior by the financier will in the long-run harm
the financier, this danger is minimal.
2. Providing a Mechanism to Combat Organized Crime in Switzer-
land
The Message addresses the "turning plate of the service sector" part
of the Federal Council's analysis, which involves the Swiss financial
arena being placed at the disposition of possibly criminal clients.' In
the Canton Council discussions, Minister of Justice Koller stated with
conviction that "the Federal Council is convinced, that the proposed
improvements will enable a considerably more feasible combat against
organized crime."2 8 One of the most successful tactics in fighting orga-
nized crime is to attack its financial basis, for example in this case,
punishing money laundering.' ° However, the problem created by finan-
ciers who intentionally put the Swiss market place at the disposal of sus-
pect clients cannot be eliminated by a right to communicate, since they
will certainly not avail themselves of it. Only an obligation to commu-
nicate suspicious activities and the provision of criminal liability for
failure to do so could curb organized crime in this respect.210 The same
holds true for active intermediaries on the gray market.
Although the new law may not eliminate organized crime in one fell
swoop, it is a building block in the overall plan.' Any effort to take
measures against organized crime will improve the Swiss image of neutral
inactivity internationally.
3. Appeasing Most International Pressure
The international community will applaud the new law's attempt at
combatting organized crime and money laundering.' The United States
will benefit from the new law if financiers choose to report suspicious
"Islands of 'basic criminal' organizations" and "the risk of infiltration in the legal
economy" problems are addressed by Art. 260' P-CP and art. 58ss of the Bill.
Message, supra note 3, at 274.
2 Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 110.
209 Bundesblatt 1992 VI 9 (Switz.).
211 The new law does not create an obligation of communication. This is not to say
that an obligation to communicate would solve all money laundering problems in
Switzerland. The obligation of communication was not included in the new law at least
partially due to the fact that "the notion of an obligation to denounce is foreign to
Swiss Penal Law." Message, supra note 3, at 314.
211 Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 98.
2' See discussion infra Section VI.C.3.
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activity involving a U.S. matter. However, the United States already
attained what it desired from Swiss authorities in the 1990 legislation
which outlawed money laundering.213 Also, the FATF, whose review of
Swiss attempts at combating money laundering is already so positive as
to label Switzerland a paragon in combating money laundering,2 4 is
likely to be extremely satisfied with the new law. The FATF had only
criticized Switzerland for its failure to combat money laundering in the
non-bank sector of the market place.215 Because the new law encom-
passes the entire financial market place, not just the banking sector, that
loophole has been eliminated. On the other hand, since the interdepart-
mental group of the E.C. proposed an obligation to communicate for the
entire Swiss financial market,"6 they are unlikely to be completely
satisfied with the diluted version of it - the right to communicate 7
4. The Elimination of the Dilemma Created for Swiss Bankers by
Article 305'
There are two contrasting views on whether the new law will
eliminate the Article 305' dilemma offered by critics and proponents in
Switzerland. On the one hand, the Swiss Bankers' Association stated in
an official statement to the Federal Council that the new law218 offers
a feasible solution to the dilemma that bankers are confronted with.219
On the other hand, one criticism of the new law's ability to eliminate the
dilemma is presented by Prof. Dr. jur. Gftnther Arzt. °
Although Artz labels the new law as reasonable and approves of it,
he emphatically denies that it will eliminate the dilemma for the Swiss
banker.' In fact, Arzt claims that not only will the right to commu-
213 See discussion supra Section V.C.
214 FATF Report, supra note 59.
2" Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, supra note 59.
216 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
217 Message, supra note 3, at 322.
218 It was, at the time, only a pre-draft. Id.
219 Letter from Jean Paul Chapuis & A. Hubschmid, Swiss Bankers' Association
(June 28, 1991) (on file with author). In addition to the right to communicate, the
Association suggested that the bill also contain a provision that the financier also not
be civilly liable if they report their findings in "good faith." Message, supra note 3,
at 322.
' Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Bern, Switzerland. See generally
Gflnther Arzt, Organisierte Kriminalitdt- Bemerkungen zum Massnahmenpaket des
Bundesrates [Organized Crime - Comments to the Package of Measures of the Federal
Council], in AKTUELLE JuRisTIscHE PRAXIs 1187 (Oct. 1993).
2' Id. at 1188.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
nicate not free the banker from his dilemma, but it will create a dilemma
where there was previously none.' Arzt explains it this way: currently
there is no dilemma.m First, under current legislation, bankers are enti-
tled to break off all business ties with the suspected criminal without
being held liable for money laundering, since the law allowed them no
alternative. 4 However, even if the relationship between the banker and
the client has not already progressed far enough to make the banker
criminally liable under Article 305', the pursuit to combat money laun-
dering is hampered by a policy that encourages bankers to break off all
ties with money launderers thus eliminating the possibility of prosecution
since no proof can be attained. This is not in accordance of the Swiss
policy of combatting money laundering.2"
Secondly, Arzt points to the "collisions in duty" defense' which
he claims could be asserted by the banker to support his theory that there
is no dilemma in current Swiss law concerning banking secrecy. 7
Another Swiss legal scholar describes this concept more generally as the
"justification due to an emergency"'' or as a "preservation of a higher
interest" defense. 9 The argument applies when bankers are presented
with a situation where they discover suspicious criminal activity, yet are
bound by banking secrecy not to report the activity. According to these
Swiss scholars, they should be able to side-step their absolute duty of
banking secrecy in order to discover whether the law requires them to
report the activity in order to escape criminal liability themselves.'
Additionally, the related defense of "preservation of higher interests"
refers to the interest of securing assets that are of suspect criminal
origin." There is currently a debate among legal scholars in Switzer-
land concerning the applicability of this defense. 2 However, the Federal
222 Id. at 1193.
223 This is contrary to what the Federal Council, the Expert Committee, and the
Bankers' Association believe. Message, supra note 3, at 318.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 HARRO OTro, PFLICHTENKOLLISION UND RECHTSWIDRIGKErrSURTEIL 38-53 (1974);
"Pflichtenkollision" or the "collision in duty" defense is a nebulous concept over which
Swiss legal scholars themselves are not in agreement. Message, supra note 3, at 315.
' Arzt, supra note 221, at 1193. The "collision of duties" defense is not founded
on law; it is a non-legal defense. Message, supra note 3, at 315.
"' The concept of an "emergency" defense derives from Article 34 of the Swiss
Penal Code. PENAL CODE art. 34 (Switz.).
2' Stratenwerth, supra note 185, at 112.
230 Id. at 113.
23 Id.
232 Id.
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Council takes the position that no defense exists for bankers in the
dilemma situation created by Article 305'."
The new dilemma being created by the new law that Arzt perceives
arises because of timing problems. If financiers communicate too early,
before they can substantiate their suspicion, they would be criminally
liabile for violating banking secrecy. On the other hand, if financiers
communicate too late, they would be liable for money laundering. 4
Basically, Arzt claims that the new law only provides one small "logical
second" in which the financiers' rights to communicate exonerate them
from all liability.235 Arzt fails to recognize that it is quite reasonable for
Swiss legislators to require some proof or signs that substantiate the
financier's suspicion of criminal activity. More than likely, whatever gave
rise to the suspicion would be enough to substantiate it." Additionally,
financiers are not likely to report suspicions without being able to sub-
stantiate them because they would risk losing clients.
The underlying concern evident in the Arzt article is that Swiss
authorities might use financiers as secret detectives to investigate money
launderers. 7 This is not entirely avoidable since more information may
be required to prosecute suspects after the initial communication has been
made, and the evidence needed may not be readily available. However,
since Swiss financiers approve of the new law because of to its value in
combating money laundering, this criticism lacks significance.
The Commission reviewing the new law, aware of Arzt's criticism,
decided that no changes should be made. 8 Although the right to com-
municate may not eliminate all delicate questions concerning the line
between the right to communicate and the duty of confidentiality, which
the Commission admits, 9 the new law proves the dedication of Swiss
legislators have to be innovators in combating organized crime and money
laundering. The right to communicate will ensure that financiers, who
report suspicious activities and can substantiate their claims, are immune
z Message, supra note 3, at 315.
This is the dilemma which exists under current Swiss law. Arzt, however,
believes that defenses existed previously which provided the banker with an "out." The
dilemma he sees being created is actually a much narrower one which is unlikely to
exist since it would involve financiers reporting suspicions that they absolutely could
not substantiate. The new law would not protect the financier in case of such a
communication. Id. at 317.
Arzt, supra note 221, at 1194.
See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
27 Arzt, supra note 221, at 1195.
Protokol 1, supra note 40, at 88.
29 Id.
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from criminal prosecution for breaching banking secrecy. In such in-
stances the dilemma is eliminated for the financier.
D. Swiss Banking Goes Unharmed
Switzerland is a "nation of bankers."2' The awareness by the inter-
national community of the change in Swiss banking secrecy laws creates
the possibility that cautious investors may choose to do their investing in
other countries with more stringent secrecy laws. According to one Swiss
banker,24 however, the new law should have no perceivable effect on
Swiss banking or the volume of money coming into Switzerland.24 His
conclusion is based on the fact that the strength in Swiss banking is in
corporate, not private, banking. It is a myth that Swiss banking secrecy,
which allows for money laundering abuses, is the cornerstone of Swiss
banking.243 Banking secrecy has often overshadowed "the diversity of
services and depth of technical expertise which are the true hallmarks of
the Swiss [banking] system.""
Today in Switzerland foreign business accounts are responsible for
one-third of the total banking profits. 5 Among Swiss bank's most
efficient services are investment consulting and portfolio management.'
Additionally, the Swiss Financial Center has a major currency market
"providing foreign-exchange facilities for transacting and safe-guarding
international trade and guaranteeing unlimited, around the clock access to
liquid funds in any currency."247 Because of the expertise and stability
in Swiss banking, a change in the banking secrecy law will not signifi-
cantly dent Swiss banking.
24 This is considering that in 1988 there existed a total of 5,600 banks and branch
offices. PRESENCE OF SwrrzERLAND, supra note 1, at 132.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 DEAK & CELUSAK, supra note 18, at 223.
Id. Historically Switzerland benefitted from the political instability of its neigh-
bors. During and after the two world wars there was a considerable inflow of capital.
PREsENcE OF SwITERLAND, supra note 1, at 132. These favorable banking conditions
and Switzerland's security-conscious population "elevated Switzerland to one of the
world's major financial centers." Id. Also, Swiss banking legislation, which requires
banks to maintain high levels of capital reserves, created the essential investor security
base. Id.
245 PRES NCE OF SwrrzERLAND, supra note 1, at 132.
246 Id.
247 Id.
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VII. NEW PROPOSAL: SWISS FEDERAL LAW CONCERNING THE FIGHT
AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
Swiss legislators committed to the combat against money laundering
proposed to introduce a law containing seventeen articles crafted to fight
money laundering in a comprehensive manner.2" The Draft specifies the
duties of the financiers in Switzerland so that money laundering can be
prevented and that penal authorities have the necessary legal instruments
at their disposal249 to fight this kind of criminal activity. This law will
be different from the new law discussed in this Note in that it will not be
part of the Penal Code, but will be an independent federal administrative
law. 50
The most significant Article in the Draft, is the obligation for the fi-
nancier"5 to communicate. According to the Draft, the right to commu-
nicate in PC Article 305' Paragraph 2, and the obligation to communicate
in GwG article 8 VE, are to be understood as the same concept." 2 The
24" Swiss Money Laundering Draft Preamble, supra note 170. This proposal, which
includes an obligation to communicate for the financier, was introduced while the new
law, PENAL CODE art. 305"' Marginal Note and Para. 2, was still under consideration
in the Parliament. See Bundesgesetz zur Bekdmpfung der Geldwdscherei im
Finanzsektor, [Federal Law to Combat Money Laundering in the Financial Sectors]
GwG art. 8 VE (Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss Money Laundering Draft Act]; Message,
supra note 3.
249 Swiss Money Laundering Draft Preamble, supra note 170, at 2.
2 Id. at 3.
,' Swiss Money Laundering Draft Act, supra note 248.
1. Whoever knows or has a substantiated suspicion, that an act punishable by Article
305' of the Swiss Penal Code was committed, must inform the appropriate authorities
of penal pursuit or the federal authority of the police without delay.
2. In this case, the business relation may not be commenced or the transaction complet-
ed, until the decision of the federal authorities, according to Article 10 or the authorities
of penal pursuit according to Article 11 has been made, unless, a delay is not possible.
If within 5 workdays no decision has been made, then a business relation can be
commenced or the transaction can be completed. The relevant files must in any case be
secured.
3. Until the decision according to Paragraph 2, but the latest during the deadline of five
workdays, neither those concerned, nor third persons may be informed about the com-
munication or any information, unless the denial of a transaction must be explained. The
authorities of penal pursuit and the federal authorities may extend this deadline.
4. Whosoever after the application of the care, which may be demanded of him ac-
cording to the circumstances, offers a communication or does not complete a transaction
according to paragraph 2, cannot be made liable because of a violation of the ad-
ministrative-, professional- or business secrecy or be held civilly liable.
212 Id. at 20.
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difference is that the obligation to communicate requires knowledge or a
substantiated suspicion that a criminal activity according to PC article
3 0 5bis was actually committed, while the right to communicate only
requires evidence of a suspicion that monies have a criminal origin. 53
What is to result if the Draft is enacted as written, is a spectrum of
awareness, which begins with a suspicion and ends with certainty. Where
there is at first a right to communicate for the financier, and finally an
obligation to communicate, once there is evidence that PC article 30 5b"
was violated. The drafter's intention was that the two laws would comple-
ment each other in this way.
254
At last, it is possible to speculate that the end of Swiss banking
secrecy may be near should this Draft be enacted. Discussions in the
National Council concerning the new law clearly indicated that Swiss
legislators are willing to make drastic changes in Swiss law in the name
of fighting money laundering.55 Until the financial sector's reactions
concerning the Draft manifest themselves, however, the likelihood of its
passage is difficult to assess. Considering the recent support of the new
law by the financial sector, the view is likely to be prevalent that the
right to communicate is sufficient for the time being.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The new law does not eliminate the basic principle of banking
secrecy established by Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Code. It simply
provides an exception for financiers who are in the position of being able
to substantiate suspicions of criminal activity involving Swiss financial
institutions. With the exclusion of this carefully carved exception, Swiss
banking secrecy remains unaffected.
The new law is well-tailored to meet the majority of the needs and
problems that the Federal Council recognized in Switzerland, especially
concerning money laundering and organized crime. Even money launder-
ers who engage in pre-laundering schemes involving non-banking financial
institutions will encounter great difficulty in Switzerland when presented
with unwilling and suspicious financiers. The financier in Switzerland
finally has a weapon to strike out against criminal abuse of the Swiss
financial market. The new law will have a deterrent effect.
Whether the new law proves successful in its aim at curbing money
laundering and organized crime will take longer to assess25' The Swiss
253 Id.
254 Id.
25' See Protokol 2, supra note 67.
256 Critics warn that a penal law is not in itself sufficient as a means to counter
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financial market's image, on the other hand, will immediately experience
an intended improvement. Swiss legislators, well aware of the value
bestowed by international approval of legislation aimed at preventing
money-laundering, were quick to announce the proposed bill (now the
new law) to the international press on the day the bill was presented to
the Federal Council.57 By the speedy approval of the new law and the
recent ratification of the European Agreement on Fighting Money Laun-
dering in 1993, Switzerland intends to signal to the world that its fman-
cial market is no longer the financial haven the world perceives it to be.
The success of the legal change is not determined by the enactment of
the law, but by the financiers' willingness to avail themselves of their
legal right to communicate substantiated suspicions to the authorities and
the authorities' ability to handle the information effectively.5 8 Although
the right to communicate may not be the end all solution to money laun-
dering in Switzerland it is a tool that the financier was in dire need of.
Fighting money laundering in Switzerland is an ongoing process which
may include an eventual obligation for the financier to communicate
suspicious activity as foreseen in the Draft proposed in January of 1994.
these dangerous forms of criminal activity. Protokol 2, supra note 67, at 2025.
' Swiss Close Loophole in Banking Secrecy Laws, THE REUTER ASIA-PAcIFc Busi-
NESS REPORT, June 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUAPB File.
" "The best criminal law norms will not be useful to us at all, if they are not as
well applied efficiently at the front." Protokol 2, supra note 67, at 2026.
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